1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

NPT/CONF.1995/MC.I/SR.2
25 April 1995

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

MAIN COMMITTEE I

SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 2nd MEETING

Held at United Nations Headquarters, New York,
on Thursday, 20 April 1995, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. AYEWAH (Nigeria)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (continued)

1. Mr. MAZLAN (Malaysia) said that the Conference offered a unique opportunity for States parties to the Treaty to advance the cause of global nuclear disarmament. It was important to ensure that the decision to be taken would be based on an objective evaluation of the Treaty and would best serve the interests of the States parties in their quest for global security. The notion of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons was an entirely practical proposition which the international community should strive to attain.

2. The nuclear-weapon States' fulfilment of their obligations under the preamble and article VI was far from satisfactory. Recent achievements in the area of disarmament were of limited scope and fell far short of expectations; the world was still a dangerous place.

3. His Government's decision on the extension of the Treaty would depend on the result of the work of the three Main Committees. Regarding Main Committee I, his delegation would press for the inclusion of positive language reflecting unfaltering commitments, particularly from the nuclear-weapon States, on the following issues: a programme of action by the nuclear-weapon States in respect of negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons; establishment of a comprehensive test-ban treaty; cessation of the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes; internationally negotiated, legally binding security assurances; and adherence by the nuclear-weapon States to nuclear-free zones. The nuclear-weapon States should demonstrate greater commitment to disarmament through a programme of action to eliminate all nuclear weapons within a ten-year period beginning in 1996.

4. His delegation would also request a guarantee that States parties could exercise their right to withdraw from the Treaty, in accordance with article X. That right, together with the aforementioned programme of action, were prerequisites for his delegation's agreement to an extension of the Treaty.

5. A comprehensive test-ban treaty, which would end the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, was essential to the halting of the nuclear-arms race. His delegation would work for a commitment by the nuclear-weapon States to conclude a verifiable comprehensive test-ban treaty by the end of 1996, and for the maintenance by the nuclear-weapon States of their moratorium on testing.

6. The cessation of the further production of fissile materials for weapons purposes was another vital link in non-proliferation measures. Encouraging progress was already being made. A non-discriminatory and verifiable convention should be drawn up at the earliest possible date, banning the production and stockpiling of such materials.

7. Recent efforts in the area of security assurances, while welcome, were clearly inadequate, failing to meet the call by the non-nuclear-weapon States for legally binding security assurances. The nuclear-weapon States should accept a binding international instrument on the subject. Referring to recent

positive developments in the field of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, he said the nuclear-weapon States should also show a positive attitude to the creation of such zones and to the establishment of appropriate guarantees.

8. The full and fair implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty would lead the international community on the road to complete nuclear disarmament. The security of future generations would depend on whether the international community, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, had the courage to grasp that opportunity.

9. Mr. MERNIER (Belgium) said that the discouraging results of the early years of the Treaty had been considerably improved upon recently, since the trend towards escalation had been reversed, with a number of highly significant reductions, such as those achieved by the START agreements, in the world's nuclear arsenal, and the moratoriums on nuclear testing accepted by four of the nuclear-weapon Powers. He hoped that they would soon be joined by China.

10. Although the level of nuclear armaments was still too high, the international community was visibly on the right track, and the fact that the multiplication of nuclear-weapon States had been largely averted was another example of success which was of itself sufficient to justify the indefinite extension of the Treaty. Universality was an important goal, and those States which were not parties to the Treaty should be encouraged to accede to it.

11. Once extended, the Treaty would need to be strengthened and reinforced by other measures, such as the current moratoriums on nuclear testing, and efforts to ban the production of fissile material for weapons use. Steps of a more political nature were also needed, such as the security assurances desired by the non-nuclear-weapon States, and the establishment of additional nuclear-free zones.

12. The overall picture was positive, but there was still a long way to go, and the work remaining to be done in the interest of nuclear non-proliferation required a stable and permanent legal framework which the Treaty could provide.

13. Mr. ARAR (Turkey) said that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had reduced the risk of nuclear war, but dangers still existed. A huge majority of States currently agreed on the necessity of further reductions in nuclear weapons and maintained the goal of complete nuclear disarmament.

14. He welcomed the steps which had recently been made, particularly those concerning the States of the former Soviet Union. The comprehensive test-ban treaty, once concluded, would play a vital role. Another important step would be the conclusion of a treaty providing for a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons purposes and he welcomed the current efforts in that area at the Conference on Disarmament.

15. He also welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on positive and negative security assurances, sponsored by the nuclear-weapon States. Despite its weaknesses, the Non-Proliferation Treaty remained the sole assurance of nuclear non-proliferation and the only multilateral treaty providing commitment to nuclear disarmament. His delegation was of the view that only a permanent

Non-Proliferation Treaty could ensure those two crucial elements of global security, which was why it supported the indefinite and unconditional extension of the Treaty.

16. Mr. TYUTYUNNIK (Ukraine) stressed the need to promote efforts to bring about a nuclear-weapon-free world. In the past five years, nuclear arsenals had been significantly reduced and the number of the so-called "threshold" States with nuclear weapons in their territory had decreased. At the same time, the number of States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had grown. Ukraine, which was the first State in history to renounce voluntarily nuclear weapons, was also proceeding, together with the Russian Federation, to destroy the third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world.

17. His country had repeatedly expressed its support for the indefinite extension of the Treaty as a key instrument for weapons monitoring and disarmament. At the same time, the possibility of unconditional extension seemed very problematic. The main condition for strengthening the Treaty and for its indefinite extension was clear and conscientious compliance by all States parties with its provisions. In that regard, the principles concerning nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament put forward by the Government of South Africa should be given careful consideration. The granting of security assurances to the non-nuclear-weapon States parties was of particular importance among the overall measures to strengthen the non-proliferation regime. The absence of such assurances in the Treaty was its "Achilles heel". The adoption by the Security Council of resolution 984 (1995) had been an important step towards eliminating that shortcoming. Lastly, Ukraine supported the idea of elaborating a legally binding international instrument on security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon States parties.

18. Mr. PATOKALLIO (Finland) said that without the strict implementation of articles I and II, which contained the basic obligations of the Treaty, its objectives could not be fulfilled and it would lose every shred of credibility.

19. The obligations under article II had been challenged twice since the Fourth Review Conference. In the case of Iraq, non-compliance had been established beyond the shadow of a doubt. In the case of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, doubts still remained, and needed to be removed.

20. Prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons called for continuous effort. The current Conference should reaffirm that non-proliferation had become a global norm of behaviour. It should also welcome the accession since 1990 of a large number of States. The accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine as non-nuclear-weapon States was commendable. With the accession of South Africa, the Treaty counted among its parties the first State which had voluntarily rolled back its nuclear-weapon programme. The non-proliferation regime had been significantly strengthened, and the Treaty was approaching universality. Further efforts needed to be made to that end.

21. The ending of the nuclear-arms race was a historic step in the implementation of article VI. Thanks to the START treaties, the two biggest nuclear-weapon States were in the process of reducing their nuclear arsenals by two thirds. The Conference should stress that the implementation of those

treaties in the fastest manner compatible with safety and security was of key importance. The United States and the Russian Federation had taken a number of other arms-reduction measures concerning both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. He looked forward to additional steps on the part of China, France and the United Kingdom.

22. The Conference should reaffirm that the ultimate goal of article VI was the elimination of all nuclear weapons; however, it should also be emphasized that disarmament, including conventional disarmament, was an obligation on all States parties. Positive developments had taken place, but more attention was needed, and conventional arms were used daily in conflicts around the world. Excessive accumulation of such weapons was a growing concern in many regions.

23. A comprehensive test-ban treaty was currently the single most important nuclear issue; the Conference on Disarmament should be urged to conclude its negotiations by the end of 1995. The treaty should be truly comprehensive, and effective verification was essential. Cutting off further production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes was also an important measure.

24. The non-nuclear-weapon States parties had the right to demand credible security assurances. They had no interest in providing a "free ride" to those States which had not accepted the same undertaking. Finland therefore welcomed the adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995).

25. Mr. KAREM (Egypt) said that, while Security Council resolution 984 (1995) addressed the issues of assistance and compensation to States which were victims of a nuclear threat or attack in a fairly comprehensive manner, it offered no credible protection to non-nuclear-weapon States. Comprehensive and unqualified security assurances in the form of a legally binding instrument were a legitimate right of all non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty. Security assurances could be enhanced through complementary action to achieve regional nuclear-weapon-free zones. His delegation had been active in the area of regional disarmament and had proposed an initiative for the establishment of a zone free from all weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East. To that end, it was vital that all States in the Middle East should accede to the Treaty as a first step towards establishing such a zone.

26. Contrary to the principles of non-proliferation, the Treaty had permitted the number of nuclear weapons to increase considerably during its 25-year life span. Despite the progress achieved in the past five years, his delegation, as many other non-nuclear-weapon States, regretted that greater achievements had not been possible under article VI of the Treaty. It was imperative that the final document of the current Conference should contain a clear commitment from the five nuclear-weapon States regarding the future of the nuclear-disarmament process with a view to attaining the ultimate goal of total nuclear disarmament. The failure to reach agreement on a final text for the comprehensive test-ban treaty constituted a serious loophole in the non-proliferation regime. While some States parties saw testing as a way to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons, others believed that a comprehensive test-ban treaty would put an end to the nuclear-arms race by preventing qualitative improvement and thus vertical proliferation. His delegation supported a comprehensive and verifiable test-ban treaty - as opposed to the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty - and favoured a

non-discriminatory and universally applicable treaty banning the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices.

27. Ms. LAOSE-AJAYI (Nigeria) said that existing cooperation between nuclear-weapon States in the area of nuclear-weapon research and development undermined article I of the Treaty. Now that the cold war had ended, there was no justification for such collaboration, which the Committee should address during its review.

28. While the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had largely complied with article II, some parties, and also non-parties, to the Treaty had acquired weapons-grade materials from nuclear-weapon States. The Committee should also address that issue and discuss how Governments' export policies should be brought into line with their obligations under the Treaty.

29. The assurances provided for in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) required further clarification to strengthen their effectiveness. Since the non-nuclear-weapon States parties had renounced nuclear weapons, they deserved to be assured in treaty form that they would not be victims of the use or threat of use of such weapons. At the Fourth Review Conference in 1990, her delegation had submitted a draft proposal on negative security assurances, which could serve as the basis for the Committee to express, in its current report, a commitment to draw up a legally binding instrument on negative security assurances.

30. Despite significant progress towards disarmament in recent years, there continued to be a need for greater transparency in nuclear disarmament. A nuclear-weapons register of qualitative and quantitative measures for nuclear disarmament and a clear timetable for future disarmament were needed. Her delegation proposed that a programme for nuclear disarmament should include the conclusion and entry into force of an agreement on negative security assurances within one year, an irreversible ban on nuclear testing by 1996, the prohibition of weapons-grade fissile materials by the year 2000 and a commitment to begin negotiations for a total ban on the production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons by 2005.

31. Mr. BERDENNIKOV (Russian Federation) said that his delegation attached great importance to a comprehensive and objective review of the operation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which should lead to the conclusion that its indefinite and unconditional extension was vital. The Treaty had withstood the test of time and confirmed its role as an important instrument to check the spread of nuclear weapons, thus providing stability in the nuclear field without which there could be no global or regional stability. It had laid the foundation for irreversible progress towards disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament, and guaranteed the development of broad international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. All countries, large and small, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon, needed the Treaty.

32. The Russian Federation's commitment to the ultimate goal of complete nuclear disarmament had been reaffirmed in the declaration which it had recently made, jointly with three other nuclear-weapon States, at the Conference on

Disarmament (NPT/CONF.1995/20). As evidence that the nuclear-arms race had ceased and been reversed, he referred to the signing within the past few years by the United States and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and subsequently the Russian Federation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty) and the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II Treaty). Under the INF Treaty, a whole class of nuclear weapons had been eliminated from the arsenals of both Powers by the end of May 1991. Moreover, in total, approximately 40 per cent of the Russian and United States nuclear arsenals would be reduced within seven years under the START I Treaty, and further considerable reductions were provided for under the START II Treaty. At the same time, under unilateral disarmament measures, the Russian Federation had already transferred a large number of its tactical nuclear weapons to central facilities and storage areas for the purpose of eliminating them.

33. The Russian Federation and the United States had also mapped out new large-scale measures. In September 1994, the Presidents of the two countries had signed a joint statement on strategic stability and nuclear security issues, under which they had agreed to expedite the implementation of bilateral strategic-arms-reduction agreements, and they had instructed their experts to intensify discussion of ways to reduce and limit the remaining nuclear forces.

34. The time had now come for other nuclear Powers to join in the process. In that connection, the President of the Russian Federation had, at the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, suggested that the five nuclear Powers should develop a treaty on nuclear security and strategic stability, under which the proposed measures could be carried out on a step-by-step basis in view of the differing nuclear potentials of the countries concerned.

35. His delegation welcomed the establishment, within the Conference on Disarmament, of an ad hoc committee to negotiate a multilateral convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, which should provide for appropriate verification, and was pleased to note that a mandate for negotiations had been agreed upon. The Russian Federation had already ceased to produce weapons-grade uranium, and a national programme to discontinue the production of weapons-grade plutonium was under way. In fact, the fissile materials currently produced in the Russian Federation were not being used for nuclear-weapon purposes.

36. The Russian Federation was participating actively in the negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament regarding a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, which it was hoped would be concluded in the near future. The moratorium on nuclear tests, to which his country would continue to adhere, created an environment conducive to the negotiations.

37. The provision of more clearly defined security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States was important to the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime and to international stability. In that connection, he referred to the recent adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which provided for appropriate assistance by the Security Council in the event of nuclear

aggression or the threat of such aggression against a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and took note of the statements by the nuclear-weapon States concerning negative assurances.

38. With regard to disarmament in the field of other types of weapons of mass destruction, the Russian Federation had been among the first to sign the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and was preparing legislation providing for the discharge of its obligations in that connection. It also supported efforts to strengthen the regime of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction and intended to work towards achieving agreement on a verification mechanism at the forthcoming multilateral negotiations.

39. Major steps had also been taken recently to limit conventional arms and armed forces in Europe.

40. The Russian Federation, like the former Soviet Union, had complied strictly with its obligations under article I of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As for article II, the newly independent States which had previously belonged to the former Soviet Union had taken collective decisions aimed at preventing the proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons, and an international legal mechanism had been created which provided for the removal of such weapons to the Russian Federation and for the elimination of most of them. The Russian Federation remained the only nuclear-weapon State in the territory of the former Soviet Union, while Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan had acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States and had fulfilled their obligations thereunder.

41. With regard to article VII, he said that the Russian Federation continued to advocate the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East, Africa, South Asia and elsewhere, as a means of strengthening international peace and security, and that it was a party to the relevant protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). His delegation hoped that support for the creation of nuclear-free zones would be reflected in the report of the Committee.

42. Ms. FORSYTH (New Zealand) said that recent history had underlined the fact that the risk of the spread of nuclear weapons was greatest in those regions where instability, tension and lack of cooperation remained the norm. Therefore, the Conference should aim, above all, to strengthen the climate of security in which nuclear disarmament could occur and to reaffirm without reservation its commitment to the non-proliferation and disarmament norms embodied in the Treaty. The goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world could not be achieved as long as some States with advanced nuclear capabilities remained outside the Treaty and its safeguard system. The Conference should warmly welcome recent adherents to the Treaty and express a determination to secure its universal application. Full compliance with articles I and II was essential to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The record of compliance with article II had been tarnished by the actions of two States parties to the Treaty, Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both nuclear-weapon

States and non-nuclear-weapon States should recommit themselves to strict and full observance of those articles.

43. The aim of the Committee, in reviewing the implementation of article VI, should be to reinforce the moves towards nuclear disarmament of the past five years and offer specific recommendations for the future. Such recommendations should include the conclusion without delay of negotiations for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The commitment of all five nuclear-weapon States to the uninterrupted observance of testing moratoriums would be a welcome signal of seriousness in that regard. States parties should also urge the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations for a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. Furthermore, States parties should discuss verifiable measures to bring a permanent end to vertical proliferation by stopping the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear-weapon systems and the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. In addition, the Conference should encourage further reductions in the nuclear arsenals of the five nuclear-weapon States.

44. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty had long held that they were entitled to effective international arrangements to assure them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons pending their elimination. While some had already received such assurances through the operation of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones, the Conference should consider what further measures could be pursued in a multilateral framework such as the Conference on Disarmament to strengthen security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States which had made firm non-proliferation commitments.

45. Mr. ERRERA (France) reviewed the many measures France had taken to reduce its nuclear forces and scale down its nuclear-weapons programmes adding that, to promote transparency, the President of France had given, in 1994, a full account of all French nuclear forces. In addition, France had just given the non-nuclear-weapon States positive and negative security assurances the wording of which had been harmonized with those of four of the five nuclear Powers.

46. Now that the nuclear-arms race was over, France hoped that the START I Treaty would be fully implemented. Negotiations on a complete ban on nuclear tests were progressing, and he hoped that a treaty would be included without delay. France welcomed the decision taken by the Conference on Disarmament regarding negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices and urged that negotiations should begin forthwith. France, together with the United States, the Russian Federation and the United Kingdom had just solemnly reaffirmed its commitment to the pursuit of negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

47. As for other disarmament measures, France would seek to promote universal ratification of the Chemical-Weapons Convention, and to establish a verification regime for the biological-weapons Convention, strengthen the ban on anti-personnel mines and to help develop regional arms control.

48. Strengthening of the non-proliferation regime - in particular the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty - was a basic element for continuing the general disarmament process.

49. Mr. KIM (Republic of Korea) said that, while his delegation considered that the Non-Proliferation Treaty should be extended indefinitely, efforts to eliminate discrimination and address the shortcomings of the non-proliferation regime should continue. An international norm delegitimizing the development and possession of nuclear weapons under any circumstances should be further strengthened with a view to achieving complete non-proliferation. The Republic of Korea would continue to participate in the diplomatic campaign for nuclear non-proliferation at both the regional and global levels.

50. Over the past 25 years, the Non-Proliferation Treaty had provided a firm and dependable foundation for preventing nuclear proliferation and had served as the primary legal and political deterrent to the uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons. In order to build on the positive global perception of the Treaty, to which more than 170 countries had become parties, it was important for both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to make concerted efforts, on a non-discriminatory basis, to comply in good faith with their respective obligations under the Treaty.

51. The legitimate concerns about the discriminatory aspects of the Treaty expressed by the non-nuclear-weapon States could be resolved if and when the goal of comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament was achieved with the full participation of all nuclear-weapon States. One of the most urgent tasks for the nuclear-weapon States was to take the lead by substantially diminishing the political and military significance of nuclear weapons so that none of the non-nuclear weapon States would attempt to develop them.

52. Bilateral efforts between the United States and the Russian Federation to implement nuclear disarmament provided further evidence of the progress made towards nuclear disarmament. The early ratification of the START II Treaty would make it possible to achieve epoch-making progress by the year 2003. In addition to such bilateral efforts, multilateral efforts were needed towards comprehensive and complete nuclear disarmament. His delegation noted with satisfaction the tangible progress made recently in the ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, which might contribute to the successful extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Negotiations on the test-ban treaty should be concluded at the earliest date and with the full participation of all States concerned.

53. The consensus adoption by the Conference on Disarmament of a mandate for the establishment of an ad hoc committee on the issue of fissile material for weapons purposes had marked real progress towards the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime. His delegation looked forward to the early establishment and operation of that body.

54. The adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on security assurances had contributed to the indefinite extension of the Treaty. His delegation noted with satisfaction the collective initiative made by all nuclear-weapon States in dealing with comprehensive security assurances, both

positive and negative. That was an important step towards achieving the extension of the Treaty and the further strengthening of the non-proliferation regime.

55. Mr. DUMORE (Netherlands) stressed the need for the safe processing of fissile material resulting from the dismantling of nuclear warheads. That was time-consuming and costly, and should be carried out in an environmentally sound manner. The Government of the Netherlands had recently contributed $1 million for such a project in Ukraine.

56. He also stressed the significance of Security Council resolution 984 (1995), which represented an important step in the field of security assurances by including both negative and positive security assurances.

57. He welcomed the agreement reached by the Conference on Disarmament to begin negotiations on a ban on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive purposes through the establishment of an ad hoc committee.

58. His delegation fully supported the current negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. At its 1994 session, the Conference had made important progress in drafting the nuclear-test-ban treaty. With regard to verification, much work had been done in preparation for an international monitoring system, which, by monitoring possible test explosions, should be the core of the verification system. In that regard, the agreement reached at the end of 1994 concerning monitoring techniques had been of great importance.

59. The negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty were building on those foundations, and further substantial work had been done on verification, particularly on-site inspection. A major breakthrough had been reached with regard to the scope of the treaty, and there was currently a much clearer prospect of what it would eventually prohibit. In addition, there seemed to be consensus that a comprehensive test-ban treaty should be of indefinite duration, an example which the 1995 Review and Extension Conference should follow.

60. Mr. WESTDAL (Canada) said that, although complete nuclear disarmament had not been achieved and although some States had still not signed the Treaty, and indeed some States parties had even violated the Treaty, nevertheless articles I, II and VI had served to protect the international community. The Treaty had profoundly altered attitudes towards nuclear weapons, stigmatizing and delegitimizing them. At the time the Treaty had been drafted, some had feared that there could be as many as 20 or 30 nuclear-weapon States by the end of the century. Moreover, all five declared nuclear-weapon States were parties to the Treaty, had strengthened their security assurances and were trying to put an end to testing. All had agreed to negotiate the end of the production of fissile material for weapons. There were currently 178 States parties to the Treaty, an eloquent statistic which gave cause for hope.

61. The prerequisites for complete nuclear disarmament were beyond the world's current imagination and would be realized only with the establishment of political institutions and laws that were more effective than existing ones. It was certain, however, that the international community needed to instil global

values of compassion, restraint and the honour of compromise in the peaceful resolution of disputes. In the meantime, the massive number of nuclear weapons must be reduced and those that remained must be tightly sheathed. In that regard, the first obvious step was to make the Treaty permanent and to keep the promises embodied in it. That implied a comprehensive nuclear test-ban, a cut-off in the production of fissile material for weapons, and treaties to supplement START I and II. It also meant more nuclear-weapon-free zones and universal accession.

62. While there continued to be horrors in the world, from Bosnia to Burundi and beyond, the international community must take advantage of the current situation in which there was no conflict or strife between major Powers. Canada advocated permanence with accountability: permanence, because there appeared to be no circumstances under which it would ever make sense to "lose" the Treaty; and accountability, because the profound promises inherent in the Treaty would not be kept without vigilance and hard work. Accordingly, the Governments of States parties must be held to account for their custody of the values of the Treaty and the fulfilment of its obligations.

63. Mr. NEAGU (Romania) stressed the obligations of both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States to comply with their undertaking to ensure non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, and to pursue nuclear disarmament. The Treaty had proved to be a strong barrier to nuclear proliferation, despite the long-lasting arms race. The final document of the current Conference should include a call for universal adherence to the Treaty. Building on the significant progress made in recent years, including the START I, START II and INF Treaties, the final document of the Conference should endorse the objective of further reductions of nuclear arms with the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament. Given the significant role of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Romania strongly favoured its indefinite and unconditional extension.

64. To the extent of its possibilities, Romania had made its own contribution both to the development of a political environment favouring the dramatic achievements he had just mentioned, and to the process of disarmament. Romania had begun a process of democratization and integration into the democratic structure of Europe and the world. It had also contributed directly to the conclusion of the INF Treaty, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and other global agreements. His country was also contributing to the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a landmark process which should be reflected in and encouraged by the final document of the current Conference.

65. Another significant development was the agreement reached at the Conference on Disarmament to establish a negotiating committee on the cessation of production of fissile material for explosive purposes. That effort should also be encouraged in the final document of the current Conference.

66. Romania welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the security assurances given by the five nuclear-weapon States. That resolution did not, however, fully meet the expectations of many non-nuclear-weapon States, and the matter of assurances should be further pursued at the Conference on Disarmament.

That objective should also be mentioned in the final document of the current Conference.

67. Mr. WHEELER (South Africa) drew attention to the statement recently made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of South Africa at the fourth plenary meeting of the Conference (NPT/CONF.1995/SR.4). Specifically, he wished to reiterate his Foreign Minister's proposals regarding the adoption of a set of principles for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament and the establishment of a committee to study the review process and make concrete recommendations on how to improve and strengthen the review conference mechanism. His Foreign Minister had also suggested some specific matters that might be taken up by the proposed committee (NPT/CONF.1995/SR.4, para. 9).

68. South Africa believed that the disarmament provisions in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty were essential for the implementation of the Treaty. Security assurances were also a key element of the Treaty; in that regard, his Government welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995). It remained convinced, however, that the most effective way to address the issue would be to negotiate an international agreement prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

69. During the forty-ninth session of the General Assembly, South Africa had expressed its support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, which afforded an added dimension to the security provided by the Treaty. Complete nuclear disarmament was the key to international and regional security. South Africa now understood that the Treaty provided greater security than did the nuclear weapons which it had destroyed.

70. Mr. GARCIA (Colombia) said that his Government hoped that both the Committee and the Conference as a whole would be able to reach some basic agreements by consensus. His country strongly supported the elimination of nuclear weapons and all weapons of mass destruction, as attested to by the fact that it was a State party to the Treaty on Antarctica, the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Because of the fundamental role played by the latter in overall non-proliferation efforts, his delegation favoured extending it. The decision on extension must strengthen the Treaty and must provide the assurance that the purposes set forth in the preamble and the Treaty as a whole would be fully met.

71. His delegation considered that it was now reasonable to look forward to further reductions in nuclear weapons, and hoped that the nuclear-weapon States would be willing to work towards total elimination of such weapons. In absolute terms, however, and despite recent progress, more nuclear weapons were now in place than when the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been signed. The review must not be limited to an inventory of achievements or shortcomings; it must provide a basis for a plan of action, within a definite time-frame, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

72. His delegation attached special importance to the following measures: immediate cessation of the arms race, with a view to general and complete disarmament under effective international control; conclusion of a comprehensive

test-ban treaty; the signing by the nuclear-weapon States of a legally binding instrument offering negative and positive security assurances; conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the production and stockpiling of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other explosive devices; establishment of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones and accession by the nuclear-weapon States to the instruments establishing such zones; universal application of the Non-Proliferation Treaty; guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States of non-selective access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology; and strengthening of the IAEA safeguards system in order to include the activities of all the States parties to the Treaty.

73. Mr. MORADI (Iran) said that in its discussions, the Committee needed to balance the retrospective and the prospective aspects of its work, with a view to identifying specific measures to be taken to enhance the operation of the Treaty and ensuring that any extension provided for the realization of its purposes and provisions in the earliest time possible. All States parties must reaffirm their commitments under articles I and II and the first three preambular paragraphs of the Treaty. In the light of some reported cases of violations of articles I and II, the Committee should note with concern that ongoing collaboration in connection with materials and technology transfers between nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and between those States and States not parties to the Treaty, on the other hand, undermined the objectives of the Treaty.

74. Much remained to be done towards fulfilment of article VI, as nuclear arsenals far exceeded those of 1968, when the Treaty had been signed. The nuclear-weapon States should commit themselves to a programme of action for total elimination of nuclear weapons within a definite time-frame.

75. With regard to article VII, his delegation would like to see a reaffirmation by the Committee of the importance of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the expansion of the geographical scope of existing ones. The Committee should urge all nuclear-weapon States to adhere fully and unconditionally to all existing nuclear-free zones, and to commit themselves to refraining from any act that might endanger the status of such zones.

76. His delegation hoped that the Committee would underline the significance of the guarantees afforded by the Treaty and urged all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to strengthen their commitment through a legally binding instrument, either in the form of a protocol to the Treaty or as a separate instrument.

77. Mr. EKWALL (Sweden) said that it was encouraging to note the new trend in arms control and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The significant progress made in the field of chemical and biological weapons and the steps taken to halt the arms race and reduce existing nuclear arsenals were all encouraging developments. Work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty was now well under way and an ad hoc committee had been set up to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes. The negative security assurances given by the nuclear-weapon States, complemented by the positive assurances provided for in Security Council resolution 984 (1995), were

further steps in the right direction. In addition, with the number of States parties to the Treaty standing at 178, it was now approaching universality.

78. All those developments must be duly reflected in the final records of the current Conference. However, the goal must remain a nuclear-weapon-free world. Further steps must be taken. The nuclear-weapon States must reaffirm their commitment to the elimination of nuclear arsenals, in the spirit of the preamble to the Treaty. In accordance with its article VI, further negotiations must be conducted in good faith on measures for nuclear disarmament. The nuclear-weapon States should also establish a specific time schedule for the implementation of such measures.

79. In the shorter time perspective, it was to be hoped that the comprehensive test-ban treaty would be concluded by the end of 1995. His delegation also looked forward to a prompt start of negotiations on a "cut-off" treaty on fissile material. Not only future production but also existing stockpiles should be the subject of such negotiations. In addition, a multilateral, legally binding international treaty on security assurances should be concluded.

80. Propitious conditions must be maintained for further efforts towards a nuclear-weapon-free world; there must be no doubt regarding the future of the Treaty. His country therefore supported its indefinite extension. At the same time, however, it called for further steps to be taken to reduce the level of nuclear arsenals.

81. Mr. LAPTSENAK (Belarus) said that his country complied strictly with all its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As a successor State of a nuclear Power, Belarus had unconditionally rejected the possibility of possessing nuclear weapons. It had become a party to the Treaty as a non-nuclear-weapon State and had recently signed a safeguards agreement with IAEA. His country was also conscientiously carrying out its obligations under the 1987 INF Treaty, the 1991 START I Treaty and a number of documents of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Thus, Belarus was continuing its efforts to ensure compliance with article VI of the Treaty.

82. Aware of the serious danger of proliferation, his country underscored the need to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in central Europe. Belarus welcomed the assurances set forth in Security Council resolution 984 (1995) and the unilateral declarations concerning negative security assurances by the five nuclear Powers. The resolution, together with those declarations, represented an important step towards the elaboration of a legally binding international instrument and demonstrated the readiness of the nuclear Powers to conduct a single policy vis-à-vis the demands by non-nuclear-weapon countries for security assurances and assistance in case of nuclear aggression. The adoption of Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a good step forward and should be followed by further efforts to strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

83. In view of the need for greater international stability, the Conference should seek the indefinite extension of the Treaty and its universality. Belarus welcomed further steps to eliminate nuclear weapons with the participation of all nuclear Powers and was prepared to work for the speedy

conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and to participate actively in all areas of arms monitoring.

84. His delegation believed that the Conference would create a new moral climate in the world, in which any plans to acquire nuclear weapons would be considered contrary to the interests of the majority of States and, therefore, totally intolerable. That belief would be significantly strengthened by a firm pledge by the nuclear Powers to step up their efforts to comply with their obligations under the Treaty and to carry out further disarmament measures.

85. Mr. SHA Zukang (China) said that, ever since acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, China had adhered strictly to its provisions. China had faithfully fulfilled its non-proliferation obligations under the Treaty and had maintained a policy of not endorsing, encouraging or engaging in the proliferation of nuclear weapons or assisting other countries in developing such weapons.

86. At the same time, the legitimate rights, interests and demands of States, in particular the developing countries, with respect to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy must be taken into account. It was absolutely inadmissible to adopt double standards or, under the pretext of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to restrict or hamper the use of nuclear energy by developing countries for peaceful purposes.

87. Non-proliferation was not an end in itself but served only as an intermediate step towards the ultimate goal of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States should negotiate and conclude, at an early date, a treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons, under which they would undertake to ban and destroy all their nuclear weapons under effective international supervision.

88. China had never shied away from its obligations with respect to nuclear disarmament and had undertaken a number of unilateral obligations not undertaken by any other nuclear-weapon State, namely, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and, unconditionally, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones.

89. China did not endorse the policy of nuclear deterrence, and the nuclear weapons that it had developed were solely for self-defence. China had always advocated the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons and had never taken part in the nuclear-arms race. It had always exercised the utmost restraint with respect to the development of nuclear weapons and had kept its nuclear arsenal at a minimum level. China had also exercised restraint with regard to nuclear testing. It had conducted fewer nuclear tests than any other nuclear-weapon State. Moreover, China had never taken part in an arms race in outer space.

90. China had actively participated in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament and would welcome the conclusion of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. In that regard, the Chinese Minister for Foreign Affairs and the United States Secretary of State had signed a joint statement to promote the

conclusion of such an instrument. China welcomed the recent decision by the Conference on Disarmament to establish an ad hoc committee to that end.

91. For the purpose of initiating negotiations among the nuclear-weapon States on a treaty of mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons, China had formally presented a draft treaty to the other four nuclear-weapon States, proposing that the five nuclear-weapon States should begin the first round of consultations in Beijing. In September 1994, the President of China and the President of the Russian Federation had issued a joint statement reaffirming the commitment of both countries to the mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons and declaring that they would no longer aim their nuclear weapons at each other. His delegation hoped that that declaration would lead to a joint declaration by all five nuclear-weapon States on the mutual non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

92. China supported the establishment, on a voluntary basis and through consultations, of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones free of weapons of mass destruction. China had signed Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Additional Protocols II and III to the Treaty of Rarotonga. China welcomed the efforts made by the African countries to establish an African nuclear-weapon-free zone. China also supported the Middle East countries in their efforts to establish a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

93. At the request of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, China had issued statements, in December 1994 and February 1995, respectively, to provide them with security assurances. On 5 April 1995, China had issued a statement reaffirming negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States and also undertaking to provide positive security assurances to those States.

94. Mr. HERNANDEZ (Argentina) said that, as a country that developed and exported nuclear technology and material, Argentina, which had recently acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, reaffirmed its commitment to comply with articles I and II of the Treaty and encouraged all other States parties to do likewise. Argentina firmly believed that the strengthening of the safeguards system and the full implementation of the export-control regimes would help ensure compliance with those provisions. Such controls constituted a necessary guarantee accompanying the development of nuclear capabilities with a view to promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and enabling countries to export nuclear material in a responsible, safe and transparent manner.

95. A number of important developments had taken place since the 1990 Review Conference. The United States and the Russian Federation had undertaken serious measures to end the nuclear-arms race and promote nuclear disarmament. The two countries had concluded two treaties on the reduction and limitation of their strategic offensive arms (START I and START II) and were currently destroying approximately 2,000 nuclear weapons a year. Such measures had encouraged the remaining nuclear Powers to begin to consider similar steps.

96. The current favourable international climate had made it possible to begin negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The drafting of the treaty was nearing completion, and his delegation welcomed the recent declaration by the

five nuclear Powers of their intention to negotiate intensely with a view to concluding the treaty without delay.

97. Another important development had been the agreement to establish a negotiating committee on the cut-off of production of fissile material for explosive purposes. His delegation welcomed the decision of the United States Government to place under IAEA safeguards additional fissionable material produced by the United States or resulting from the disarmament process. His delegation also welcomed Security Council resolution 984 (1995), in which the five nuclear Powers endorsed positive and negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty.

98. His delegation believed that it was essential to extend the Treaty for an indefinite period. If that was done, the Treaty could become the basis for a new disarmament process and could strengthen international détente; that would reinforce the moral value of the decision of countries which, like Argentina, had the capacity to develop nuclear arms but had explicitly renounced that capacity.

99. Mr. TANAKA (Japan) said that, in the 25 years that the Non-Proliferation Treaty had been in effect, the progress in nuclear disarmament had not been as satisfactory as Japan had hoped. In fact, the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States were significantly greater in 1995 than they had been in 1970. On the other hand, the conclusion of START I and START II between the United States and the former Soviet Union had been encouraging. Moreover, the President of the United States had announced that the United States would withdraw 200 tons of fissile material for nuclear weapons from its stockpile, and had referred to reductions beyond those envisaged in START II. His delegation hoped that the United States and the Russian Federation would ratify START II as soon as possible and would continue their efforts to reduce and eventually eliminate their nuclear arsenals, thereby setting an example for the other nuclear-weapon States.

100. His delegation welcomed the announcement by at least one other nuclear-weapon State regarding its readiness to reduce its nuclear weapons. The United States and the Russian Federation were continuing their disarmament efforts, and it was time for the other three nuclear-weapon States to take more serious steps towards the reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

101. The considerable progress made in the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the Conference on Disarmament was also encouraging. The test-ban treaty should be concluded at the earliest possible date. Japan also appreciated the continued suspension of nuclear testing by four nuclear Powers and hoped that China would join that moratorium in the near future.

102. His delegation welcomed the decision taken at the Conference on Disarmament to establish the ad hoc committee to negotiate a fissile-material cut-off treaty and hoped that negotiations would begin as soon as possible. His delegation also appreciated the recent declaration at the Conference on Disarmament by France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States expressing their intention to implement the provisions of the Non-Proliferation

Treaty, including article VI, and also Security Council resolution 984 (1995) on positive and negative security assurances.

103. With regard to article VII of the Treaty, his delegation attached great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones to complement the Non-Proliferation Treaty, provided that such zones took account of local conditions. The validity of the nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco had been enhanced by the accession of Brazil, Argentina and Chile to the Treaty in 1994. His delegation also commended the efforts to draft a treaty on an African nuclear-weapon-free zone.

104. The international community's common goal of nuclear disarmament could best be achieved by extending the Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely. His delegation invited all States parties, in accordance with article VI of the Treaty, to redouble their efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament so that future generations could live in a secure, nuclear-weapon-free world.

105. Mr. FOUATHIA (Algeria) said that the consideration of the functioning of the Non-Proliferation Treaty over the past 25 years should permit a thorough and realistic evaluation of the accomplishments of the Treaty regime, with a view to prolonging that regime, improving its credibility, and ultimately, attaining the goal of universality. The regimes governing other types of weapons of mass destruction should be borne in mind, the final goal being to rid the world of all such weapons.

106. The fact that the goals contained in the Treaty had not been fully achieved should not prevent the international community from taking a positive approach to the future of the Treaty. Considerable cuts had taken place in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States; although those cuts were welcome, the remaining stockpiles were still too large, and those States should continue their efforts to reduce them further and ultimately to ban them altogether, as had been done in the case of chemical weapons.

107. It was to be hoped that the current negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty would soon be successful, and an integrated approach to the issue of fissile materials had become a most urgent requirement. In addition, the security assurances required by the non-nuclear-weapon States should be embodied in a legally binding instrument, without any possibility of exceptions or differences of interpretation. The strengthening of the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones was vital for the security of all parts of the world; in that respect, it was to be hoped that particular attention would be given to the cases of Africa and the Middle East. The provisions of Security Council resolution 687 (1991) should apply not only to Iraq, but to the whole region.

108. His delegation hoped that the Treaty would be extended and strengthened; the Government of Algeria had always believed that the security of the world would be better ensured by nuclear disarmament than by the continued possession of such weapons.

109. Mr. THAN (Myanmar) said that his delegation would welcome a renewed commitment by the States parties to abide strictly by articles I and II of the

Treaty. There was also an urgent need to strengthen its verification and safeguards provisions.

110. Despite a number of encouraging instances of bilateral and unilateral arms reductions, there was still a long way to go. Nuclear-weapon States should give to the international community a firm and solemn commitment to make further deep reductions in their arsenals, and to take measures leading to total nuclear disarmament. He concurred with the points made by previous speakers regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones and security assurances; the demands made by non-nuclear-weapon States in that respect were well justified. Security Council resolution 984 (1995) was a significant step, but it had fallen far short of the expectations and requirements of the non-nuclear-weapon States, having failed to create an international legal norm outlawing the use of nuclear weapons against such States; it could therefore only constitute an interim measure. At the Conference on Disarmament a number of States, including Myanmar, had recently submitted a draft protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on the subject of security assurances. It could provide a useful basis for the elaboration of an international legal instrument.

111. The final document should contain firm and solemn commitments to the achievement of the aforementioned measures, and should reflect the importance of attaining the goal of universality. The use of nuclear weapons must be forever outlawed.

The meeting rose at 7.20 p.m.